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The object of this article is moral vegetarianism. More precisely, the aim is to 
discuss some aspects of such a practice as it is recommended by influential theo-
ries of animal ethics, and to suggest a different understanding of it. According 
to standard and mainstream animal ethics theories, vegetarian food habits are 
morally required because they prevent objectionable consequences for animals 
or they respect some fundamental rights possessed by animals themselves. I will 
stress some difficulties of accounts of vegetarianism of this kind. More specifi-
cally, I  will try to highlight how they are shown to be poor in accounting for 
the actual moral experience of people adopting vegetarian lifestyles. Obviously, 
moral vegetarianism is the expression of some kind of respect for the animals, 
but according to the view I would like to support it is better understood not just 
as the sum of single morally required and obligatory acts in favour of animals. 
On the contrary, vegetarianism must be regarded as an activity of the moral 
agent to shape his or her own character. In these terms, vegetarianism must be 
considered a part of personal moral self -development.
Vegetarianism in its different forms is an old practice. Pythagoreans are the 
most famous examples of ancient vegetarians, but many kinds of vegetarianism 
can be found all along the history of western civilisation (beside all of its various 
declinations in other civilisations). Here, my aim is not to present a  historical 
reconstruction of vegetarianism, but to develop a theoretical analysis of it. Such 






vegetarianism raised by philosophical animal ethics (even it aims at recovering 
a way of thinking this dietary lifestyle that is consonant with virtue ethics, that 
is, a classical understanding of morality). For the sake of the present discussion, 
just a historical remark is worth to be made. The different kinds of vegetarian-
ism appearing in the course of western history often shared a  common trait: 
they were thought to be a way to live differently from the whole of society. Veg-
etarianism has been often understood as a part of an “anomalous” lifestyle, and 
it is often found as a  part of the way of living of members of radical and dis-
senting communities. This historical remark is relevant for the purposes of the 
present analysis because it helps highlight the link between vegetarianism and 
the activity of shaping one’s own character. Such a  link will be the core of the 
examination of vegetarianism that will be developed here. 
What I  will specifically discuss here is reflective moral vegetarianism, even 
if for brevity’s sake I  refer to it just as “vegetarianism”. Each of the terms com-
posing the locution “reflective moral vegetarianism” requires a  brief specifica-
tion. First, for the purposes of the present discussion the term “vegetarianism” 
is defined in a quite broad sense. Usually, vegetarianism is used to describe the 
food habits of someone who bans any meat or fish from his or her diet, but al-
lows animal derived products such as eggs, milk, or honey. By such a definition, 
vegetarianism is distinguished from veganism, which refuses any kind of animal 
derived products. Here, the term “vegetarianism” will be taken to include strict 
veganism, but also other types of food habits that are less demanding than ve-
ganism or conventional lacto -ovo vegetarianism. The present use of vegetarian-
ism includes also food habits that, for example, refuse meat entirely, but allow 
for animal derived products and fish, or that refuse the eating of mammals, but 
allow the consumption of meat of other animals, such as poultry and fish. Veg-
etarianism is here extended to include lifestyles that not only exclude animals 
from food habits but can also refuse animal derived clothes (leather shoes, wool, 
silk, etc.). Finally, vegetarianism as it is used here can include the consumption 
and use of some animal derived products chosen on the ground of the way ani-
mals are bred, raised, kept, and eventually killed, allowing, for example, meat 
from free range cattle and excluding meat from factory farm animals. This lat-
ter was, incidentally, the kind of vegetarianism practiced by Richard Mervyn 
Hare, who argued in favour of it in his famous essay Why I  Am only a  Demi­
 ­vegetarian1. In brief, vegetarianism in this broad meaning and for the present 
purposes is a lifestyle that entails habits about the choice of food and/or clothes 
excluding entirely or to a certain degree food and clothes derived from animals. 
In this broad meaning, vegetarianism describes a wide and variegated ensemble 
of habits. Including in the concept of vegetarianism also the consumption of 
1 R.M. Hare: Why I  Am only a  Demi ­Vegetarian. In: Essays on Bioethics. Oxford 1993, 
pp. 219–235.
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some meat and fish can sound bizarre, but the reason for adopting such a broad 
meaning will be made clearer later on. For the moment it is enough to say that 
this definition allows us to catch the different ways in which actual people shape 
their food habits on the ground, first, of reflections about the ethics of human/
animal relationships and, second, of reflections about how they personally stand 
with respect to these relationships.
In fact, the vegetarianism I will discuss is reflective and this is the second 
feature that must be clarified. Vegetarianism is reflective since it is the outcome 
of a personal reflection of the agent. Vegetarianism is a lifestyle that is actively 
and consciously chosen by the individual. It is not simply a habit received, for 
example, through culture or education and uncritically practiced by the indi-
vidual. Of course, a vegetarian lifestyle can be received by someone as a part of 
one’s juvenile education by one’s parents, but to meet the present definition such 
a lifestyle must be somehow reviewed and critically endorsed by the individual 
in the course of his or her life. Reflective vegetarianism requires a  personal 
and critical commitment. The reflective nature of the practice means that it 
must be subjected to some kind of evaluation, that the agent weighs the reasons 
and motives in its favour and feels somehow compelled to adopt it. The very 
nature of this compulsion could be the topic of an articulated and in -depth 
analysis, but for my present purposes it can be said that it must not be neces-
sarily understood as a form of “obligation” (in the sense, for example, in which 
Kantian ethics spells out moral duties). For example, someone can feel com-
pelled to adopt a certain behaviour because, after critical reflection, he or she 
feels that it is more attuned with some fundamental traits of his or her char-
acter rather than because that behaviour meets the demands of some universal 
moral principles. 
The third element regards the moral nature of vegetarianism. The reflective 
activity underlying the vegetarian lifestyle is of a moral nature. To meet my defi-
nition, vegetarianism must – at least in part – spring from moral reflection and 
be practiced for moral motives. This does not exclude the possibility that mor-
al motives for adopting a  vegetarian lifestyle could be joined to other reasons 
(health, taste, or, for example, the desire to share food habits with one’s partner). 
Nonetheless, moral considerations ought somehow to prevail. Therefore, vegetar-
ian lifestyles predominantly motivated by reasons other than moral ones are not 
taken into account in my present analysis. To make this point clearer, another 
remark should be added. To be included in my definition, vegetarianism ought 
to rely, at least in part, on specific moral reasons. Among these reasons, the con-
sideration of the suffering and life of animals involved in the production of food 
and/or clothes must be present. These considerations can be mixed, for example, 
with a  moral concern for the environmental outcomes of factory farming, but 
moral concern for the environment should not be the only reason for vegetarian-
ism. According to my definition, vegetarian lifestyles spring out of a  reflection 
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about the ethics of human/animal relationships and the moral meaning for the 
individual of his or her habits involving the lives of animals. The ethics of hu-
man/animal relationships is at the core of reflective moral vegetarianism. 
Animal Ethics Theories and Vegetarianism
The most influential contemporary philosophical arguments in favour of vege-
tarianism are those made by Peter Singer and Tom Regan in their books Animal 
Liberation and The Case for Animal Rights, and in some of their essays2. Their 
importance is due not only to the influence that their arguments have had on the 
general public and in the academic debate on the topic of food choices and ani-
mal moral status. It is due also to the fact that their arguments (and the debate 
between the two authors) is paradigmatic of what I call “standard” and “main-
stream” animal ethics. With this definition, I label a peculiar and predominant 
philosophical approach to the ethical issues of human/animal relationships. This 
approach is characterised by a  top -down method: particular prescriptions and 
obligations are derived and deduced from abstract and general principles. This 
is a  normative approach to ethics (and it is common and widespread not only 
in animal ethics, but in the whole of the fields of applied ethics) and it can be 
seriously criticised, despite its great historical importance in shaping the public 
and academic debates on many topics (the ethics of human/animal relationships 
included). The top -down normative treatment of vegetarianism, excellently ex-
emplified by Singer and Regan, is similarly flawed by the “defects” that can be 
found in the top -down normative approach in general3. My analysis will be an 
effort to give a  richer treatment of the topic of vegetarianism and through my 
analysis to sketch the premises of a  different approach to the whole issue of 
animal ethics. 
On the basis of Singer’s utilitarianism, abstinence from animal derived prod-
ucts is morally required. If food (or clothing) is obtained by means of the suf-
fering and death of animals, and the benefits obtained from its ingestion by 
2 See: P. Singer: Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals. New York 
1975; T. Regan: The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley, CA, 1983; T. Regan: Utilitarianism, Ve-
getarianism, and Animal Rights. Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. IX, no. 4, 1980, pp. 305–324; 
P. Singer: Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. IX, no. 4, 1980, 
pp. 325–337.
3 See, for example: A. Baier: Doing Without Moral Theory? In: Postures of the Mind: Essays 
on Mind and Morals. Minneapolis 1985, pp. 228–245; C. Diamond: Moral Differences and Di­
stances: Some Questions. In: Commonality and Particularity in Ethics. Eds. L. Alanen, S. He-
inämaa, T. Wallgren. New York 1997, pp. 197–223.
Going Veg: Care of the Animals or Care of the Self? 147
humans do not surpass the amount of suffering incurred, then such food ought 
not be consumed. According to Singer’s utilitarianism, the consequences of eat-
ing meat and animal derived products are the reasons for the moral obligation 
to practice vegetarianism. Animal -based food ought to be banned since it en-
tails morally blameworthy effects, raising the total amount of suffering in the 
world. As long as non -animal food alternatives are available, the benefits ob-
tained by humans through the eating of meat consist just in the pleasures of 
taste. According to Singer, these pleasures are “trivial” and cannot outweigh 
animal suffering. The way Singer (along with philosophers like him) dismisses 
the importance of animal based food is representative of the oversimplification 
entailed by top -down normative approaches. Surely, pleasures derived by eating 
animal products are enormously inferior to the suffering of animals involved 
in their production; nonetheless, the meaning and role of animal derived food 
in human life cannot be reduced to the specific pleasures experienced by single 
humans eating it. Later on I will be more specific on this. For the moment it is 
enough to take note of this point. 
Another controversial point of Singer’s argument for vegetarianism is raised 
by its strict consequentialist nature. Vegetarianism is obligatory since it prevents 
suffering and the killing of animals. Nonetheless, in a complex society like ours 
we can never be sure that our abstinence from animal food saves specific ani-
mals from suffering and killing. Our individual actions could not make any 
difference; that is, they could not actually change the total number of animals 
involved. Singer is aware of this objection and stresses the importance of consid-
ering our actions as always being linked to those of others and he mentions also 
the value of our choices as an example for other people. Nonetheless, if we could 
be absolutely sure that our abstinence from meat would not change in any way 
the consequences for animal suffering and death, then eating that meat would 
be morally neutral and permissibile. Even if perfectly consistent with Singer’s 
general theoretical framework, there is something odd in this conclusion. There 
is something that is not captured by Singer’s theoretical framework. Even if my 
refusal to eat meat does not prevent in any way some specific animal from suf-
fering and being killed, it can still be important for me. A consistent utilitarian 
could regard such feeling of importance without actual consequences as a form 
of superstition, since only actions with measurable outcomes are morally im-
portant. Nonetheless, the subjective importance of vegetarianism also in similar 
cases cannot be dismissed in the way Singer does it. My treatment of vegetarian-
ism and its connection with the notions of self -development and care of the self 
will be an effort to suggest a richer and more articulated view of vegetarianism 
and its moral meaning. 
Tom Regan’s theory avoids the abovementioned difficulties of Singer’s ap-
proach, but at the price of doubtful and demanding metaethical commitments 
about the nature of “inherent value” and of moral rights. Beside the metaethi-
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cal issues that I have no room to tackle here, Regan’s approach shows problems 
similar to those of Singer’s theory. Suppose a  friend invites me to go with him 
to a  dinner that I  was not supposed to attend. The expected guests were nine 
and so the host cooked ten steaks (nine for the guests, one for himself). When 
I sit at the table, the host cuts about a tenth of his steak and gives it to me, and 
asks each of the other guests to do the same in order to let me have a meal like 
all the others. Can I  be held responsible for the violation of the rights of the 
animal whose flesh has been transformed into steaks for my host? Here I  can-
not proceed to an analysis of the slippery notion of responsibility that would be 
entailed by the effort of arguing that also in this case I would have breached the 
rights of the animal. On the contrary, I would simply remark that in a case like 
that described above, it would be much more likely to refuse the pieces of others’ 
steaks claiming that eating meat is not part of my own lifestyle and that it is not 
essential to have been directly involved in the causal process of the production 
of meat to refuse to eat it. It is more likely, for example, that the refusal to eat 
that meat would be defended by claiming that food obtained through animal 
suffering is something that we do not regard as something good for us, whoever 
might be ultimately responsible for the suffering involved. Food obtained at the 
price of animal suffering does not correspond to one’s own identity and views. 
In this terms, being vegetarian is not the outcome of a moral obligation (as in 
Singer’s and Regan’s cases), but a  form of self -expression and respect for one’s 
own identity and views.
Humans and Food
The top -down normative approach to vegetarianism is problematic in other 
respects. In a  nutshell, Singer’s and Regan’s theories underestimate the impor-
tance and complexity of meat -eating habits in the human form of life. They also 
underestimate the richness of actual human moral reflections about such hab-
its and of the behaviours generated from those reflections. According to them, 
moral thinking and reasoning ought to reveal to us the triviality of meat eating 
with respect to the suffering of animals involved in their production. Of course, 
if the pleasures of taste experienced when eating a steak are isolated and directly 
compared to the suffering experienced by an animal during its miserable life 
and death on a  factory farm, those pleasures can only appear to us as trivial. 
Nonetheless, such kind of isolation is inadequate, since it leads to an underesti-
mation of the meaning and role that eating animal -based products have in the 
human form of life. Condemning such eating habits by defining them just as 
trivial pleasures completely fails to grasp those meanings and roles. An ethical 
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analysis of vegetarianism should seriously address both the biological and cul-
tural dimensions of meat -eating. The use of animals for food is not contingent 
and accidental, but it is a structural part of the human form of life as we know 
and inhabit it.
The domestication of animals and their use for food has played a crucial role 
in the biological and cultural evolution of Homo sapiens. According to a  con-
vincing hypothesis, the cognitive capacities required to domesticate and keep 
animals have been the basis of human capacity for mind -reading, which is 
the essential mental faculty for life in large social groups, which in turn is the 
core of the development of human civilisation4. Furthermore, life in large so-
cial groups and the switch to the stationary life made possible by domestication 
and breeding has brought about a  tremendous acceleration in the development 
and transmission of culture5. Animal breeding and use is not the only factor 
that opened the path of human civilisation, but it is among the most important 
ones. Therefore, the practice of eating animal -based products is deeply embed-
ded in “human nature” and in the human form of life. It has been a propeller 
of human civilisation. Of course, this fact is not a  justification for eating meat 
in our present condition of life, but it must be taken into account when dis-
cussing the moral basis of vegetarian choices. Furthermore, this fact contradicts 
any discourse about the presumed “naturalness” of vegetarianism. It is common 
among vegetarians to justify the vegetarian choice by making an appeal to the 
presumed “naturalness” of vegetarianism. Yet, omnivorous habits are not mor-
ally questionable because of their presumed unnaturalness. Beside the fact that 
in general any appeal to the concept of “nature” in ethics is flawed and question-
able6, this particular use is defective for other reasons. If we use a  stipulative 
notion of “nature” and define it as that which is common and usual for human 
beings or that which is consistent with human biological nature, then we must 
simply recognise that omnivorous alimentation is perfectly “natural”. 
To reconstruct the place that animal -based eating has in the human form of 
life, it is useful also to recognise the multiple cultural roles that it plays in hu-
man life. To discard certain eating habits by saying that after all “it is just food” 
would be a gross mistake. Food has many meanings in human life: it is part of 
our social and emotional lives. We acquire food habits through education, and 
they become part of our identity (a point that is brilliantly made clear by Jonath-
an Safran Foer in his insightful book Eating Animals7). Particular recipes, their 
4 P. Shipman: The Animal Connection. A New Perspective on What Makes Us Human. New 
York 2011.
5 J. Diamond: Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York 1997.
6 For classical arguments, see: J.S. Mill: “Nature” in Three Essays on Religion (1874). In: The 
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X – Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society. Toronto 
1985.
7 J. Safran Foer: Eating Animals. Boston, MA, 2009.
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taste and smell, can be placed deep in our memories. They can be part of our 
familial and local traditions. It is not wrong to say that there are foods that be-
long to us in a deep sense, in the same sense in which some places, dialects, and 
kinds of music belong to us and shape our characters and personalities. Most of 
such things that shape us are not directly chosen by us ourselves, but are simply 
received through habit and education. We are somehow passive with respect to 
them. We are often unaware of the fact that many of our habits have such deep 
roots in our social, familial, and personal history. Being conscious of such roots 
is a first step in the process of shaping one’s own identity and character. Going 
vegetarian can be a transformation of this kind. 
Vegetarianism and Personal Moral Life
My view is that a  rich and theoretically fruitful understanding of vegetarian-
ism should start from these last remarks. Vegetarianism is a  transformation of 
oneself by means of taking into one’s own hands one’s habits and practices and 
eventually changing them. Describing vegetarianism in this way does not reduce 
the moral importance of vegetarianism with respect to mainstream normative 
ethical arguments. On the contrary, it tries to grasp that moral importance in 
all its different aspects. The aspect that is valorised by this different view of veg-
etarianism is a particular aspect of moral life that is underevaluated in contem-
porary philosophical ethics, but that was crucial in the philosophical treatment 
of ethics in ancient times. This aspect has been critically analysed in depth by 
authors like Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot, who traced its presence in clas-
sical philosophy, calling it the “care of the self”. In the third volume of his His­
tory of Sexuality, titled precisely The Care of the Self, Foucault examines how the 
concept and practice of the care of the self shaped sexual habits. A quote from 
this book can be enlightening and helpful for understanding what kind of hu-
man experience must be called “care of the self”:
It is in Epictetus no doubt that one finds the highest philosophical development 
of this theme. Man is defined in the Discourses as the being who was destined 
to care for himself. This is where the basic difference between him and other 
creatures resides. The animals find “ready prepared” that which they need in 
order to live, for nature has so arranged things that animals are at our disposal 
without their having to look after themselves, and without our having to look 
after them. Man, on the other hand, must attend to himself: not, however, as 
a consequence of some defect that would put him in a  situation of need and 
make him in this respect inferior to the animals, but because the god [Zeus] 
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deemed it right that he be able to make free use of himself; and it was for this 
purpose that he endowed him with reason. The latter is not to be understood 
as a substitute for natural faculties that might be lacking; on the contrary it is 
the faculty that enables one to use, at the right time and in the right way, the 
other faculties. In fact, it is this absolutely singular faculty that is capable of 
making use of itself, for it is capable of “contemplating both itself and every-
thing else”. By crowning with this reasoning faculty all that is already given 
to us by nature, Zeus gave us the possibility and the duty to take care of our-
selves. It is insofar as he is free and reasonable that man is the natural being 
that has been committed to the care of himself. The god did not fashion us 
out of marble, like Phidias his Athena, who forever extends the hand on which 
Victory came to rest immobile with wings outspread. Zeus “not only made you, 
but entrusted and committed you to yourself alone”. The care of the self, for 
Epictetus, is a privilege -duty, a gift -obligation that ensures our freedom while 
forcing us to take ourselves as the object of all our diligence8. 
The practice of the care of the self is a  typical human experience, but it is not 
necessary in order to live. It is necessary in order to live well. It is the search for 
the good life that motivates the care of the self. This practice is not purely intel-
lectual. It starts from reflection and thinking, but its aim is the transformation 
of daily life and habits. Caring for oneself poses a demand to critically consider 
one’s own life and to introduce changes in order to achieve self -development. 
Vegetarianism can be regarded as a critical detachment from received food hab-
its. This detachment is driven by a  critical moral reflection about our relation-
ships with animals and the role we want to have with the non -human world. 
Therefore, it can be regarded as consistent with the idea of care of the self. As 
a matter of fact, in antiquity food was an important part in many declinations 
of the practice of the care of the self.
In spelling out the general idea of vegetarianism as a form of care of the self, 
the idea must be more precisely articulated. The expression “care of the self” 
can be potentially misleading and give the impression that moral consideration 
of animals does not play a role in this interpretation of the practice of vegetari-
anism. Also in this case vegetarianism springs from a  reflection about the im-
portance of the suffering and life of animals. Nonetheless, this reflection takes 
a path that is different from that of more conventional theories of animal ethics. 
Centring vegetarianism on the transformation of the agent’s practices and habits 
avoids the language of moral status, obligations, and rights that is characteristic 
of top -down normative ethical theories. In this respect, this alternative view of 
vegetarianism speaks a language that is similar to that of virtue ethics. Vegetari-
anism can be intended as a  practice consistent with a  virtuous character, that 
is, a character refraining from cruelty and sympathetic towards suffering of all 
8 M. Foucault: The Care of the Self. The History of Sexuality. Vol. III. New York 1988, p. 47. 
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sentient beings. Rosalind Hursthouse’s treatment of vegetarianism in terms of 
virtue ethics is exemplary: 
Can I, in all honesty, deny the ongoing existence of this suffering? [the suff e-
ring of animals used for food] No, I can’t. I know perfectly well that although 
there have been some improvements in the regulation of factory farming, what 
is going on is still terrible. Can I think it is anything but callous to shrug this 
off and say it doesn’t matter? No, I  can’t. Can I  deny that the practices are 
cruel? No, I can’t. Then what am I doing being party to them? It won’t do for 
me to say that I am not actually engaging in the cruelty myself. There is a large 
gap between not being cruel and being truly compassionate, and the virtue of 
compassion is what I  am supposed to be acquiring and exercising. I  can no 
more think of myself as compassionate while I am party to such cruelty than 
I could think of myself as just if, scrupulously avoiding owning slaves, I  still 
enjoyed the fruits of slave labor9. 
“It won’t do for me to say that I am not actually engaging in the cruelty myself”: 
if I take care of myself, I cannot indulge in practices, like eating meat from fac-
tory farming, that depend on such an amount of cruelty. Rather than being the 
accomplishment of a duty towards animals (as in Singer’s and Regan’s theories), 
vegetarianism is above all a  form of responsibility towards myself. Going vege-
tarian requires a preliminary reflection about human/animal relationships and 
then about the meaning of food habits that – as we have already said – are usual-
ly received and not knowingly chosen. Someone who decides to become a vege-
tarian needs to become aware of his or her own food habits and must change 
them. This change is not just a transformation of one’s own opinions about the 
moral status of animals; it is a  transformation of one’s own daily life and ha-
bits, which is a  form of self -development. This change in practices can be very 
demanding, at least at the beginning. Seeing animals as an unacceptable source 
of food does not immediately entail a  disgust for meat or other animal based 
foods (in many cases such a disgust never appears and some vegetarian people 
maintain a strong appetite for meat or other animal based foods). Therefore, ve-
getarianism requires self -education and discipline (and discipline is a crucial fe-
ature of the idea of care of the self as we receive it from ancient thinkers). Going 
vegetarian requires changes also in familial and social relations (any vegetarian 
knows what I am talking about). In brief, vegetarianism is a  transformation of 
one’s own identity, as long as our identity is also defined by our daily habits and 
relations. As has been said, it is a  change requiring discipline, and therefore 
various kinds of vegetarianism (veganism, lacto -ovo, and so on) can be seen not 
9 R. Hursthouse: Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals. In: The 
Practice of Virtue. Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics. Ed. J. Welchman. India-
napolis 2006, pp. 141–142.
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just as the outcome of different views about what kind of food it is acceptable to 
obtain from animals, but also the outcome of different ways in which vegetarian 
people transform and develop themselves. 
Vegetarianism intended as a form of care of the self, character -development, 
and self -transformation allows for a pluralism that is unavailable to normative 
ethical theories. If vegetarianism is an obligation deduced from a  general nor-
mative theory, then there is just one morally correct vegetarian behaviour, and 
exceptions to such behaviour must be justified case by case only for very special 
reasons. All moral agents must be vegetarians in the same way to fulfil the moral 
obligation that is deduced from a normative theory and that is identical for all 
rational moral agents. On the contrary, if vegetarianism is regarded as a process 
of individual self -care and personal transformation, it must be recognised that it 
can take different forms. As was said at the beginning, there is a wide range of 
behaviours that can be labelled reflective moral vegetarianism. Of course, affirm-
ing this kind of pluralism raises the question of moral relativism. Are all these 
declinations of vegetarianism equally correct from the moral point of view? This 
is a  topic that I cannot face here. For my present purposes, I can only reply to 
the objection of moral relativism that in general our relationships with animals 
are nowadays undergoing a process of change and transformations. This process 
of transformation and moral reform is ongoing and open. In this present situa-
tion we must recognise different ways for people of being aware of such change 
and of being part of it. This is true not just for the topic of vegetarianism, but 
for all the instances of human/animal relationships. Their future depends on 
how human beings will transform their own identities and characters after re-
flection about the moral importance of animals’ lives and suffering. Nowadays, 
the boundary that must be recognised as most crucial is not that between a pre-
sumed absolutely morally right way of respecting animals and other moral treat-
ments of animals that are regarded as inadequate. The significant distinction is 
between people who deny that human/animal relationships fall into the domain 
of ethics and people who, on the contrary, recognise that our relationships with 
animals are morally meaningful and accordingly shape – individually and crea-
tively – their own lives and their daily habits. 
Abstrakt
Przechodząc na wegetarianizm: 
z troski o zwierzęta czy z troski o samego siebie?
Teorie etyki zwierzęcej głównego nurtu, reprezentowane np. przez Singera i Regana, opowiadają się 
za zachowaniami żywieniowymi wykluczającymi spożywanie jakichkolwiek produktów pochodze-
nia zwierzęcego. Zgodnie z takimi ujęciami tematu, w naszych społeczeństwach i w obecnych wa-
runkach życia, rezygnacja z żywności pochodzenia zwierzęcego jest obowiązkiem w świetle wymo-
gów normatywnych teorii etyki. W niniejszym artykule zaprezentuję inne spojrzenie na problem re-
fleksyjnego wegetarianizmu moralnego (definiowanego w bardzo szerokim znaczeniu). Przechodząc 
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od niektórych bardzo krytycznych sformułowań do argumentów reprezentowanych przez główny 
nurt, zaproponuję stwierdzenie, że bardziej celowym jest rozpatrywać wegetarianizm jako element 
samorozwoju i troski o samego siebie uprawianych przez ludzi będących uczciwymi czynnymi pod-
miotami moralnymi. Wegetarianizm, który jest owocem osobistych refleksji na temat moralności re-
lacji między ludźmi i innymi istotami, powinien być rozpatrywany w taki sposób, w którym czynne 
podmioty moralne kształtują i kultywują swój własny charakter. Taki sposób ujmowania wegetaria-
nizmu pozwala uniknąć trudności argumentów głównego nurtu i pozwala trafniej ujmować bogac-
two i różnorodność rzeczywistych wyborów ludzi w kwestii wegetarianizmu w sferze zwyczajowych 
doświadczeń natury moralnej.
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Абстракт
Переход на вегетарианство:  
забота о животных или забота о самом себе?
Теории этики отношения к животным основного направления, представляемые, в частно- 
сти, Сингером и Риганом, высказываются за питание, исключающее употребление каких-ли-
бо продуктов животного происхождения. Согласно такому подходу к теме в нашем обществе 
и в современных условиях жизни отказ от продуктов животного происхождения является 
обязанностью в свете нормативных требований теории этики. В настоящей статье показы-
вается другой взгляд на проблему рефлексивного морального вегетарианства (понимаемо-
го в самом широком значении). Переходя от некоторых весьма критических формулировок 
к аргументам, используемым в основном направлении, автор предлагает трактовать вегета-
рианство как элемент саморазвития и самозаботы, которыми занимаются люди, являющиеся 
активными моральными субъектами. Вегетарианство как эффект личностной рефлексии на 
тему нравственности отношений между людьми и другими существами должно рассмат-
риваться сквозь призму активных моральных субъектов, формирующих и развивающих 
свой собственный характер. Такое понимание вегетаринства дает возможность избежать 
сложностей аргументов основного направления и позволяет точнее представить богатство 
и разнообразие реальных выборов людей в области вегетарианства в аспекте повседневного 
нравственного опыта. 
Ключевые слова:
этика отношения к животным, вегетарианство, моральная теория, этика добродетелей, са-
мозабота 
